Learn To Analyze Companies Better-
Jul 27th, 2011 by hackel

You’d be foolish to rely on others when you can do a much better, detailed job yourself.

With the book to your right, you’ll be able to uncover risks your brokerage firm or investment advisor is not aware of.

You’ll see why their analysis, in many cases, has been way off base. You will learn how to make the proper adjustments to the published financial statements and footnoted items, and other analysis your current adviser is not performing.

Relying on a firm’s financial statements presents risks. Companies can manipulate many activities and payments, to present themselves in a light which may not represent the true picture of cash flows and credit.

By following the methods outlined in the text you will be placed in a superior position-the result of my nearly four decades covering all phases of finance-from investment advisory, research director,  to fairness opinions. See how I took over the worst performing equity mutual fund for a year and made it the leading fund.

Wonder no more why a particular stock is falling without seeming reason, or which stocks present superior potential.

Buy “Security Valuation and Risk Analysis”.

Is your investment advisor worth a hill of beans?
Jul 13th, 2011 by hackel

How to tell if the investment advisor or security analyst you speak to is “worth a hill of beans.”


Ask the following 3 questions:


1-Explain, in detail, once you’ve estimated the entity’s free cash flows, how you arrive at the discount rate?

HINT: It’s not what you learned in grad school or the CFA exam.


2-Explain, again in detail, all of the adjustments you make to the published financial statements, to arrive at an estimate of free cash flow?

HINT: Lots of adjustments are required.


3-How do you define return on invested capital?

HINT: We’re looking for cash on cash.



For the real answers, see “Security Valuation and Risk Analysis” or call CT Capital LLC

Stability-Based Portfolio
Jul 9th, 2011 by hackel


You may have recently become aware of several new investment products based on portfolio stability factors. If you are interested in an equity portfolio composed of firms, which, by their nature, exhibit considerable financial stability, you should surely be attracted to CT Capital LLC. This is an area we have focused on for almost four decades.

Operating and financial stability have always been critical to risk analysis and investment performance, as well as how firms themselves should be managed, including capital deployment and financial structure.

Whereas the stability products that have been introduced by other firms are keyed off of quite basic metrics, the CT Capital LLC portfolio is based on a comprehensive array of detailed models that do not exist elsewhere. Our worksheets utilize both historical and real time data.

For example, a recently introduced product from a well-known firm uses balance sheet debt/equity as a stability measure whereas we include all forms of debt in our leverage ratios, including unhedged derivatives, unfunded pensions using real time assumptions, leases built in for growth (not the footnoted minimum amount), moral obligations, realism behind health care assumptions, workers compensation, purchase agreements, self-insurance, and so on. Other firms are using GAAP data; we use cash flow, and, where appropriate, normalized (smoothed) results. Our cash flow models adjust for firms which might have “managed” their assets to produce cash which, if not been managed, would have reported poor cash flows. This would include balance sheet and credit decisions geared to producing short-term cash when the financial structure is weakening as might be the risk of growth to prospective free cash flows.

We incorporate stability measures in everything we do, from sales and input costs to taxes (both effective and actual).

We evaluate and measure sovereign risk, insurance, litigation, patents, covenants, and any and all factors which might lead to a change in the firm’s stability. This, in fact, forms the basis of our cost of equity capital.

Half of our analysis is dedicated to cost of capital as it is the most important factor in risk analysis. Cost of capital and stability go hand and hand.

If you are an institutional investor, call us at CT Capital LLC and we will explain how a true stability led portfolio should be constructed.



Kenneth S. Hackel, CFA


When an Active (over Passive ) Investment Strategy Makes Sense
Jul 5th, 2011 by hackel

Arguing for a Active Investment Strategy
A recent study by Peter Mladina, Director of Research of Waterline Partners, which advocated the taxable investor own primary passively managed equities and other passive investments, is not without flaws.

The author concluded an active manager needed to show outperformance of 380 basis points (his “triple net” alpha) over a passive strategy to essentially break even in terms of similar after-tax return.

I have found most active strategies fail due to a misjudgment of risk (cost of equity capital) and incorrect definition of free cash flow. In this case a passive strategy is preferable. However, with more precise calculations of these variables sustained outperformance can be achieved.

I see little to nothing new in the paper’s general conclusions. A passive strategy, of course, works in general, as the universe cannot outperform itself when fees and other costs of an active strategy are deducted. There are other advantages of the passive strategy mentioned at the conclusion of this response. Of course, the paper is based on historical and normal results, which may be at odds with prospective happenings.

Major Reasons for Active Manager Underperformance
Security analysts, in general, do not understand-let alone quantify- the deep and often buried list of risks firms confront. A thorough insight into risk forms the basis of the discounting mechanism (cost of equity capital). A lack of awareness of these “hidden” risks (i.e. Moral obligations, derivatives, mergers or other business combinations, financial structure, pension and other benefits, taxes…) forces a valuation that is not consistent with, nor reflect the true valuation of the entity. My response here is not meant to be too great an advertisement for CT Capital but our detailed evaluation of risk as a key factor in what I believe will lead to outperformance vs. benchmarks and other active managers. I would encourage you to ask security analysts, equity managers and other investors and consultants how they arrive at the discount rate, and what they believe it is meant to capture (correct answer: risk to prospective free cash flows).

Most security analysts, investors, corporate finance analysts, and investment bankers do not understand how to measure free cash flow. I have worked all sides of corporate finance and investment advisory, and by failing to account for, including proper (re)classification and adjustment of items in the statement of cash flows, income statement, and footnotes, outperformance can only take place through luck, and I do not believe in luck as a fitting methodology outside the casino. The free cash flows are the income to the investor and its yield forms the basis of metrics used in capital decisions, including the margin of safety between the cost of capital.

So, if risk and free cash flows are not properly measured, a passive strategy makes sense. Ask yourself, what makes Warren Buffet so smart? The answer is simple: he buys assets that meet the above criteria, even though even he sometimes gets off the beaten track with regard to risk.

Back to the Paper…
I find fault with several of the assumptions in the paper. For example, the author’s “required triple net-alpha,” is derived thru a backed-into calculation after other variables are known. Unfortunately, those variables are at odds with the costs and expenses available to most large investors. Building upon the 7.77%, (which he uses as the average historical return) across the board does not recognize these more realistic assumptions and thus throws off the remaining calculations that differ with the passive strategy returns.
Let me also point out even an active strategy of a diversified portfolio based on ETF’s finds expenses much closer to the passive strategy expense other ratios’.

In some ways the author’s entire argument is circular as it assumed a manager would need to outperform by 380 basis points in order to make up for active management costs. However, those higher costs are a result of taking advantage of opportunities that a passive fund cannot (e.g. managers do not trade more for the sake of racking up higher commissions but because they believe they have superior information).

The 1.35% expense ratio, 0.89% in transaction costs, and 94% turnover, are over three times that at CT Capital LLC, as we trade at 1 cent per share with moderate turnover. I believe all three estimates are considerably higher than necessary to achieve outperformance. Mutual funds that incur research costs via commissions often do pay the higher fees quoted by the author, however this is an unnecessary expense avoided by investment advisors who use their own research teams and models. The author also quoted studies that were themselves faulty.

Regarding the tax assumption, as investment advisors tend to hold their unrealized gains over longer holding periods than realized losses, this assumption is also exaggerated.
Also, the 7.77% result used as the basis, is the return before transaction costs. I have not seen advisors report this way, although I understand what the author is trying to get at-the added return over passive- in actuality, it is unrealistic.

When adopting more practical expense, transaction costs, and tax assumptions, for a moderately trading investment manager, the triple net alpha is cut to about 73% less than the author’s ’ 380 basis point triple net alpha, or 1.03%. An investment manager in equities that can consistently outperform by this magnitude would be roughly equivalent to the author’s passive results. To believe a gross annual 380 basis point return is required over a passive strategy is unrealistic and not supported by fact and reality existing in the marketplace. I have recently seen active managers charge very low fees, not to distant from passive fees, for ultra large accounts. With worldwide economic growth slow, it is in this direction fees and expenses are headed. Actuarial assumptions have rarely been met over the past decade, and cost reduction is the preferred solution.

The passive strategy will make sense for a long time to come, although the quoted required gap (triple net) is exaggerated. Faulty security analysts, the large benchmark indexes being of considerably higher quality than the equity market as a whole, the taking of undue risks by the investment manager universe, and the identity of the whole not being greater than itself, are the reasons. On the other hand, active fees and expenses are incontrovertibly headed down and will soon provide stronger competition with passive products, including ETFs and indexing.

Unquestionably, a clandestine reason for the growth of indexed products has been the guidance and education of security analysts. Historically, except for perhaps the CFA program, which even itself is lacking, analyst training is constituted more of on-the job instruction than what is really needed, but admittedly impossible to pull off-that of on the job training at various firms in the industries covered by said analysts.

However, if investment consultants, pension sponsors, financial journalists and other advisory firms find the superior analyst and process, extreme value will be provided over the passive strategy. I have seen firsthand, over four decades, how an active strategy can earn returns many times that of a passive strategy, taking into account the greater fee and tax effects.

»  Substance:WordPress   »  Style:Ahren Ahimsa